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I INTRODUCTION
The work on "a,rtificial intelligence and human error prevention" 
continued at a robust pace with emphasis on both theory and applications.
The work related mostly to the demonstration system is summarized 
in Technical Report #3 "An Intelligent System for Monitoring and Diag­
nosis in Cockpit Environment" which is attached here as Appendix A.
The theoretical work that we have pursued is summarized in Sections 
II and III. We are confident that the extensive effort we spent in 
understanding the literature is going to pay very high dividends in the 
near future where several papers are being planned.
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II THE INTELLIGENT MONITOR
The function of the intelligent onboard monitor is to continuously 
detect errors during flight. The monitor essentially acts as a passive 
crew member, scanning the instruments and sensors, integrating the 
weather updates, and staying ahead of the aircraft. The monitor does 
not actively influence the state of the aircraft, but it can notify the 
crew of perceived present and future difficulties.
The construction of such a monitor is a formidable task. In order to 
monitor the flight, the monitor must have a wide range of flight knowledge 
such as navigation, engineering, FAA regulations, and flying skills. The 
large amount and the wide diversity of the necessary knowledge are not 
the only issues to be met, but rather, the organization and the interaction 
of the different kinds of knowledge are also important issues in construct­
ing the monitor. A well-known phenomenon in computer science is that one 
can not get more out of the computer than what one puts in. In addition 
to the techniques of knowledge base construction, the function and form 
of the knowledge base require careful consideration.
2.1 The Abstraction Levels Architecture
After studying the different kinds of knowledge required to fly an 
aircraft, we have organized the domain knowledge into four levels as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The levels are organized from the specific to
the abstract in a hierarchical fashion.
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LEVEL 1 - DESIRED TRAJECTORY, 
CONTEXT GOALS
J 1r
LEVEL 2 - AERODYNAMIC KNOWLEDGE
J 1
Le v e l  3 - f l i g h t  m a n e u v e r KNOWLEDGE
1
LEVEL 4 - AIRCRAFT SUBSYSTEM KNOWLEDGE
Figure 1
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Level one is the highest level and the most abstract. It describes the 
contextual goals of a flight phase and the desired trajectory shape. For 
example, the goals for the cruise phase might be to maintain an altitude of 
30,000 ft and to maintain a velocity of 3^0 kt. Level two is the next level 
in the abstraction hierarchy. It contains aerodynamic knowledge, or the 
forces that affect the aircraft during flight. The forces are described by 
the force vectors such as thrust, drag, lift, and weight. The next lower 
level is the flight maneuver knowledge. This level contains the techniques 
of maneuvering the aircraft through air. An example would be that one 
increases thrust and raises the nose to climb. The last level contains 
knowledge of the aircraft subsystems. For example, methods of maintaining 
hydraulic pressure belong at this level.
The four levels give organizational structure and efficiency. The 
abstraction level hierarchy is designed to provide perspective and allow the 
focusing of attention. The hierarchy also gives organizational structure 
and efficiency. Each level contains knowledge of similar type and 
influences the manipulation of knowledge at other levels. Presently we are 
examining artificial inteligence concepts and techniques to see how they 
would fit into our architecture. The works examined can be classified under 
the headings of problem solving and knowledge representation.
2.2 Problem Solving Issues
A common approach to solving a difficult problem is to 1 ) divide the 
problem into several sub-problems, 2) solve the sub-problems separately, and 
3) integrate these lower-level solutions into a coherent whole. The STRIPS 
planning system [1 ] uses Means-ends analysis to break a goal into subgoals.
Page 5
STRIPS then uses resolution theorem proving to generate the plan steps to 
achieve the subgoals. Unfortunately, STRIPS can only handle linear problems 
where the subgoals do not interact, i.e. a solution exists for a 
permutation of the top-level goals.
ABSTRIP [2] is essentially STRIPS except the precondition literals are 
ranked. A higher ranked literal intuitively means a more difficult goal. 
The rank is lowered and the solution steps are added at each rank. When the 
rank is lowered to the lowest rank, the solution is complete. The central 
idea of ABSTRIP is that more difficult subgoals should be achieved first. 
However, it is not clear how to determine whether one subgoal is more 
difficult than another.
NOAH [3] contributed ideas for breaking goal into subgoals and 
integrating the subplans into a coherent whole plan. In NOAH, the expansion 
of a goal into subgoals is encoded in procedural code. The constructive 
critics detect interaction between the parallel plan steps and reorder the 
plan steps to avoid negative interaction. The plan steps are kept in a 
partial order, and total ordering is done only when necessary.
INTERPLAN [4] is a planning system that investigates the interactions 
between parallel plan steps. INTERPLAN does not assume linear solution as 
did STRIPS and ABSTRIP. If interaction can not be avoided by a permutation 
of top-level goals, subgoals are promoted, i.e. a subgoal is moved forward 
in the plan. Promotion of subgoals allows all permutations of top-level 
goals and their subgoals. INTERPLAN examines a more complete set of 
permutations between goals and subgoals than NOAH’s critics.
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Maintaining a consistent world model is a necessary part of problem 
solving. Traditional methods of ensuring data base consistency use demons 
that watch over the data base. TMS [5] is a truth maintenance system that 
records in the data base the justifications for the assertions as well as 
the assertions. The justifications together with dependency-directed 
backtracking algorithms maintain a consistent data base with increased 
efficiency and can give a trace of the reasoning used to arrive at a 
conclusion. Justifications and dependencies can also be used to model the 
effects of a plan. [6]
2.3 Knowledge Representation Issues
Knowledge must be represented in the computer before it can be 
manipulated. How the knowledge is represented should reflect how the 
knowledge is to be used. The characteristic quality of a certain knowledge 
that makes the knowledge a desirable part of the knowledge base should match 
naturally the characteristic quality of the representation structure.
Assertions and patterns are natural expressions of facts and data. 
Semantic net is a natural structure for expressing relationships between 
concepts and facts; a node is a concept or a fact, and the link between two 
nodes represent the relationship between them. While it is relatively easy 
to write down the relationship between concepts, one must define clearly the 
meaning of the concepts and relationships. [7] People are very powerful 
processors: missing or implied meaning are filled in, and fuzzy meaning is 
clarified by context and experience. Computer, on the other hand, is very 
literal. While people have no trouble with intrinsic and extrinsic 
meanings, the computer is misled easily by inexactly defined symbols in the
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knowledge structure.
Semantic net is also a natural representation structure for set 
membership and class covering relationship. The class hierarchy can 
classify the world into an abstraction hierarchy. [8] For example, Tom is 
a man who is a person who is a mammal who is an animate thing, etc. The 
abstraction hierarchy imposes organization and provides inheritance. A node 
in the tree inherits the properties of the nodes above it. Inheritance 
increases representational efficiency since only one copy of the property is 
kept for all the members of a class.
CSA [9] is another representational system that uses nodes and links. 
CSA is used to represent the causal relations between actions and states. A 
state is a description of the world and an action transforms the world in 
some way. A node can be either a state or an action. The link between two 
nodes expresses the relationship between the nodes. CSA differs from other 
semantic net in that the nodes are restricted to only two types of entities: 
action and state. The set of links is prespecified and expresses the 
semantic relationships that can occur between actions and states.
As higher performance is expected from knowldge-based systems, 
knowledge representation structure will develop to meet this need. But 
before the domain knowledge is packaged in a representational structure, one 
must precisely define the knowledge needed, the characteristics of the 
knowledge, and how the different kinds of knowledge are expected to 
interact. The intrinsic and extrinsic properties of a concept should be 
delineated and separated. The classification and organization of domain 
knowledge are important issues of knowledge representation. The power of 
knowledge-based system grows with the development of representational
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structures that match naturally the domain knowledge that is precisely 
defined and delineated.
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III DIAGNOSIS OF THE AIRCRAFT MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
In the last report, we described the development of the Diagnosis 
System (DGS) as a preliminary step toward applying the Artifical 
Intelligence techniques in solving the aircraft diagnosis problem. This 
report deals with some new concepts we introduced into the more advanced 
system underdeveloping thereafter.
3.1 Multi-level modeling for the mechanical subsystems.
In the previous DGS system, the functional relationship among the 
aircraft subsystems is modeled as a single level network. i.e. all the 
functional components under consideration are treated equally at the same 
level - there is no "grouping" concept. The problem with such structure is 
that many of the useful diagnostic heuristics are naturally associated with 
a group of components working collectively as a single functional unit. The 
so called "subsystems" are the high level conceoptual groupings in such 
functional hierarchy. The following examples are to show the importance of 
grouping concept: (1 ) A particular failure mode, called "OVERLOAD", can
only be associated with the electrical system as a whole, taking all the 
generators and the electric loads into account. It occurs when the sum of 
loadings exceeds the limits of generator capacities. Single-level modeling 
fails to express such relationship. (2) The "fuel conservation" law is very 
useful in detecting leakage within the fuel system. Again, the usefulness 
of the conservation law is manifest only if it is associated with a section 
of components along the fuel path.
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The above discussion leads to the conclusion that there is a need for 
multi-level modeling, with the "expert" diagnostic knowledge attached to 
each functional block at every level. The knowledge attched to the 
functional block at the higher level serves to provide the "global view" for 
its subfunctions. This approach of utilizing the functional hierarchy as 
the backbone of the knowledge base systematically solves the traditional 
problems encountered by other AI researchers [10,11] who faced the 
difficulties of using only the local knowledge to proceed with their 
problem-solving, and tried to patch up by providing some demon-like global 
critics.
As in Figure 2, the aircraft subsystems (only partially shown in the 
figure) is modeled as FUEL system and POWER PLANT at the top level. The 
expert diagnostic knowledge attached to this level provides the clue for 
further investigation on its subsystems. As in this example, the typical 
expert knowledge looks like the followings: If there is a droping in the
fuel pressure measured at the interface between fuel system and power plant, 
focus next on the FUEL system. If the fuel flowrate measured at the same 
point drops, it could be either one's fault. The FUEL system is in turn 
detailed by three functional blocks: the SOURCE, the TRANSFER, and the
METERING. Again, a trunk of domain-specific diagnostic knowledge describing 
the ways to associate subfunctional symptoms with possible failures is 
attached to each subfunctional block.
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«ULTI-LEVEL KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURE
ELECTRICITY EGT EPR N2
Figure 2
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3.2 Heuristical problem-solving for the subsystem diagnosis.
The traditional problem-solving has been dealing with the finding of 
solution that is logically supported by the known facts encoded in the 
knowledge base. However, in the case of expert problem-solving, reasoning 
based on the precise logic is sometimes impractical for the following two 
reasons: (1) Most of the expert knowledge are heuristcal in nature (rather 
than definite "laws”). The expert heuristcs are summerized from statistics, 
or gathered from past experience. They are applicable to general cases, but 
failed possibly on some special cases. As a result, problem-solving based 
on "heuristcs'' requires a rather different control structure. Some existent 
techniques have been developed for other expert problem-solving systems, 
such as MYCIN [12] and PROSPECTOR [13]. These techniques are called 
"inexact reasoning" [14] or "plausible inference" [15] in the literatures.
With the idea of multi-level knowledge base in mind, our recent efforts 
have been to develop an problem-solving algorithm, based on the concept of 
heuristical reasoning, to proceed with the subsystem diagnosis. The key to 
the process is to derive the heuristics from the expert knowledge encoded in 
the functional model. At each functional block, the problem-solver selects 
those rules applicable to the current context, and evaluates the relative 
failure possiblities for each of its subfunctions. Subsequently, the 
problem-solver focuses on the subfunctional block that is probabistically 
most likely to fail. The result is a list of possible failures, prioritized 
by their relative possibilities.
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11 INTRODUCTION
A research project to investigate and demonstrate the feasibility of an 
onboard intelligent computer system for a commercial aircraft is currently 
under progress at the Coordinated Science Laboratory at the University of 
Illinois. The projected setting of the research is in the long term future 
when powerful and significant amounts of computation power will be available 
inside the cockpit. The project aims at mapping out the architecture of a 
software computer system that interacts with and assists the flight crew at a 
high-level. The feasibility of such an architecture will also be 
demonstrated.
The project was started in late 1977 by a grant from the Department of 
Transportation to study the feasibility of an advanced onboard computer system 
to enhance the safety of commercial airline flights. Since computation power 
is expected to increase while the physical size of the computer is expected to 
decrease, it is timely to study the conceptual design of an onboard computer 
system that can assist the crew in a high-level fashion in anticipation of 
technological progress. The computation power available is not considered a 
limitation in this project, however the high-level assistance to the crew and 
the ease of interaction with the crew are considered important. Since the 
computer system concerned provides Safety Enhancement by Computer Reasoning it 
has been named the SECURE system.
21.1 Preliminary Investigation
The initial effort of the project was devoted to identifying the best
means for effectively using an airborne computer system to enhance flight
safety and to familiarization with the commercial aviation environment.
Interviews with pilots were conducted to learn what they want, like or
dislike, and need in the way of automated systems and computer assistance. A
National Guard pilot and a flight engineer with American Airlines were
initially interviewed on campus.1 A third interview was conducted at the
2
Flight Operations Center of United Airlines at O’Hare International Airport. 
The whole day visit was spent in discussion with six senior captains, touring 
the dispatch area, and viewing the cockpit of a DC-10. The flight personnel 
responded positively to assistance by an advanced computer system. It was 
generally agreed that the computer system should aid the crew with the 
monitoring tasks, it should verify the correctness of instrument readings, it 
should propose failure recovery procedures, and it should inform the pilot of 
difficulties at appropriate times.
In addition to the interviews, flight operation manuals for the DC-10 
also provided the necessary background information. United Airlines furnished 
The DC-10 Flight Manual Training and Reference and The DC-10 Flight Handbook 
manuals. McDonnell Douglas provided The Systems Description and The Reference 
and Performance DC-10 Flight Crew Operating Manuals. Reference manuals for 
the CF-6 jet engine were also obtained from General Electric.
In order to gain first hand information about what pilots actually do 
under high workload and stress situations, the United Airlines Flight Training 
Center in Denver was visited and the flight crew proficiency checks and 
training sessions were observed. In these sessions flight crews in Boeing 727
3and DC-8 simulators were presented with system malfunctions such as hydraulic 
failures, generator failure, and engine flameout, and the crew’s recovery 
procedures were observed. In the discussion with the flight crew afterward it 
was pointed out that the crew's ability to respond to warning signals in the 
cockpit is reaching the saturation point. Due to the complexity of the
visual, aural, and tactile warning signals utilized today, some confusion 
usually occurs and in fact, the credibility of the signal is sometimes 
questioned.
These activities contributed greatly to the understanding of the flight 
operations and flight crew activities. They also contributed to the
understanding of how the onboard computer system can assist the flight crew.
1.2 Considerations for an Intelligent System
The essential attribute of an intelligent onboard computer system is its 
ability to provide information which can help the pilot to stay ahead of the 
aircraft. The better the pilot can anticipate the future state of the 
aircraft, the better he can make good, safe decisions concerning the operation 
of the aircraft. The safe operation of a modern aircraft depends primarily 
upon the pilot's performance, and the pilot’s performance can be improved and 
flight safety can be enhanced by an advanced computer system that provides 
relevant information to the pilot on a real-time basis.3
The primary objective is to prevent errors that are caused by the pilot 
taking an improper course of action because of inadequate information, too 
much or misleading imformation, or late information. The aviation domain is a 
time critical domain. Time margin is short and the correct action must be
4executed on time. The lack of information can leave the crew unaware or 
without direction. Too much information or misleading information would force 
the crew to spend valuable time sifting the information. Late information is 
as bad as no information as documented by many actual cases. To be useful the 
computer system must deliver the precise, necessary information on time, hence 
it must be Mintelligent”. Also to be compatible with the pilot, the computer 
system should not increase the workload of the pilot. The computer system 
should act like an additional highly-trained crewmember whose primary task is 
to assist the pilot. The value of any kind of assistance is diminished if it 
increases the pilot’s workload by requiring pilot inputs or displaying 
extraneous information. The computer system must not inundate the crew with 
too much information. Actual experience has shown that too much information 
is as bad as no information at all. To present the relevant information 
without unnecessary embellishment requires awareness of the context of the 
aircraft and its environment. In short, the system must be intelligent.
The intelligent computer system should aid the crew in all phases of the 
flight from preflight planning to inflight information processing. It should 
also be knowledgeable about the aircraft and its context so that it can 
provide relevant information fitting to the current context. To do this, an 
extensive knowledge base of the aircraft, its systems, and its flight 
environment is necessary. More details on knowledge bases and other
knowledge-based systems in the field of Artificial Intelligence are provided 
in section two.
51.3 A Scenario
The foliowing is a scenario of an application of the intelligent airborne 
computer system. The aircraft has executed the takeoff and is entering the 
climb phase. The throttles are reset to climb power and the airframe is 
cleaned up. The computer examines the sensor inputs and notices that the 
aircraft is somewhat sluggish for its current configuration. The possible
causes are deduced to be either low thrust or high drag. It then proceeds to 
check out the engines and the flight control elements in detail. After 
detailed examination it detects that the bleed valve in engine one has failed 
and the flap has not retracted fully. The computer then informs the crew of 
the faults and recommends shutting down engine one and reducing the aircraft
velocity to prevent flap damage. It then draws upon its knowledge of the
flight goals, the aircraft capability, and the aircraft aerodynamic behavior 
and recommends a new flight profile and the corresponding control 
configuration to the crew.
This scenario illustrates the high-level functions of aircraft
monitoring, system diagnosis, and recovery procedure planning. Much knowledge 
about the flight goals, the aircraft systems, the aircraft aerodynamic 
performance capability, and the aircraft system capabilities are necessary to 
realize these functions. The later sections of this report cover different 
aspects of a computer system that can perform these high-leveled tasks.
61.4 The Software System
Work was performed in the first year to develop models of the* aircraft 
4
and its environment. A software aircraft simulator was developed to provide 
the necessary computer environment. In order to make the notion of the 
intelligent computer system more concrete, work in two flight functions, the 
instrument verification system and the flight monitor, were also initiated. 
The instrument verification system determines the consistency of an output of 
an instrument with respect to the outputs from other instruments. The flight 
monitor is aware of the flight context and notifies the crew when an 
instrument reading is interpreted to be an error in the present context. 
Preliminary results were presented to Department of Transportation and Federal 
Aviation Administration personnel in Washington DC. A computer demonstration 
of the concepts developed was included in the briefing.
After the end of the first year we worked directly with the FAA, and the 
present research effort is aimed in three areas, aircraft modeling and 
simulation, knowledge-based monitoring, and system fault diagnosis. Aircraft 
modeling and simulation deals with the qualitative and quantitative 
representation of knowledge and is discussed in section three. Research in 
monitoring continues and is developing a powerful second generation 
knowledge-based monitor. This work is described in section four. Research in 
instrument verification has generalized to aircraft system diagnosis and is 
described in section five.
72 INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
Artificial intelligence is the study of ideas which enable the computer 
to perform those tasks that make people seem intelligent. The goals of 
artificial intelligence are to make the computer more useful and to understand 
the principles which make intelligence possible. The computer, essential in 
areas such as banking and inventory control, is already a prevalent force 
today, however reasearchers in Artificial Intelligence are investigating 
methodologies of giving the computer more knowledge to make it more useful and 
capable of performing more complex tasks.
The field of artificial intelligence has made impressive progress in its 
short history. Several programs have demonstrated learning ability. One 
program learns new concepts from a sequence of closely related concepts.5 
Another, given primitive concepts like multiplication, factorization, and 
prime number, can invent mathematics that even some professional 
mathematicians find interesting and exciting.6 The computer can also 
understand english. Given a short passage of text in a constrained domain, a 
program can, based on its understanding of the text, answer questions 
intelligently. 7 The computer has also demonstrated impressive problem solving
g
skills. In performing symbolic integration the computer has no human peers.
One system of programs, DENDRAL, interprets mass spectrogram data with the
9
skill of graduate students in organic chemistry. Another system, MYCIN, helps 
physicians diagnose and treat certain bacterial infections at a high level of 
skill.10
DENDRAL and MYCIN are probably the most well known artificial 
intelligence programs. Both operate in complex domains where much technical 
knowledge is required. DENDRAL determines the chemical structure of a
8substance from its knowledge of chemical bonds and the mass spectrogram of the 
substance. The substance is heated until it breaks into changed fragments. 
The fragments are then weighed and tabulated. Using knowledge of the 
composition of the fragments and its knowledge of the likelihood of bonding 
between atomic structures, DENDRAL is able to deduce the molecular structure 
of the substance. It’s knowledge of chemical bonds is stored in a library of 
production rules. A production rule is a premise-deduction pair. If the 
conditions in the premise section are satisfied the fact in the deduction 
section is deduced and added to the pool of known facts. An example of one of 
DENDRAL*s production rules looks like the following:
If there is a high peak at atomic-number/charge point 7 1,
there is a high peak at atomic-number/charge point 43,
there is a high peak at atomic-number/charge point 86,
and there is any peak at atomic-number/charge point 58,
then there must be an N-PROPYL-KETONE3 substructure.
Using a collection of about 100 productions of distilled bonding knowledge 
DENDRAL is able to perform at an expert level.
MYCIN is also an expert problem solving system except the domain is now 
bacterial infection. MYCIN is acquainted with particular cases by requesting 
information about the patient’s symptoms, general condition, history, and 
laboratory results. At each point, the line of questioning is determined by 
the ongoing analysis of all previous questions. When MYCIN is satisfied with 
its understanding of the case, it issues its diagnosis and recommendations. 
The reasoning it used to arrive at its conclusions can also be examined upon 
request.
9Like DENDRAL, MYCIN’s knowledge base consists of a library of over 300 
production rules. The form of the production rules is still the same, however 
the content is now oriented toward infectious disease. The following is a 
typical MYCIN production rule:
If the infection type is primary-bacteremia,
the suspected entry point is the gastrointestinal tract, 
and the site of the culture is one of the sterile sites,
then there is evidence that the organism is bacteroides.
Unlike DENDRAL, MYCIN uses the production rules in the backward direction. 
For each of the plausible diagnoses, MYCIN attempts to work toward primitive 
facts known from laboratory results and clinical observations.
The knowledge base is an essential component of the DENDRAL and MYCIN 
system. In order to perform at a competent level, much knowledge about the 
domain must be known to the program. A production rule captures a small 
quantum of the necessary knowledge. The form of the production rule is also 
ideal for the domain of molecular structure and infectious disease. The 
production rule is well suited to describing a large collection of facts when 
the underlying organization is either not available or not obvious. In 
another domain where the knowledge takes on a more organized form another 
knowledge structure would be more suitable.
The planning system is also a major interest in artificial intelligence. 
The planning system generates a plan, a sequence of actions that transforms 
the world from the initial state to the desired goal state. NOAH is a system 
that plans in the blocks world.1 1 It can transform the initial blocks structure 
into the desired blocks structure by moving one block at a time using a robot 
arm. NOAH uses a knowledge structure called procedural net to keep track of
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the plan while it is being developed and bugs are being worked out. The 
procedural net is a network of nodes where each node represents a particular 
action at some level of detail. The nodes are linked to form hierarchical 
descriptions of operations, and to form plans of action. The procedural net 
is a powerful knowledge structure that facilitates heirarchical planning.
A number of research efforts have been conducted at the Coordinated
Science Laboratory to study the methodologies of planning. CADM is a computer
program that helps the flight crew to make decision when the aircraft is in
12
degraded mode operation. The aircraft's internal systems are described by a 
general data structure called semantic net. Recovery procedures are 
represented by procedural nets. Through these knowledge structures CADM is 
able to detect system faults and recommend a recovery procedure.
Concurrent with the CADM project, Weissman studied planning in
13
incompletely specified environments. In an incompletely specified environment 
a system must be able to recognize when certain relevant information is 
missing and must be able to continue planning. A plan outline is developed 
and missing details are filled in when available.
Planning in an uncertain environment and planning with default plans were 
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investigated by Davis. A combination of local and global strategies can fill 
out the default plan when additional details are necessary. The planner can 
largely overcome the detriment of an inaccurate world model if it can 
experiment in the real world and if it has some idea of how to ignore some 
troublesome information.
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Intelligent systems perform tasks that are considered to require 
intelligence. High level performance requires much knowledge. The required 
knowledge can be divided into two kinds. The first kind describes the domain 
and how to affect the domain. The second kind describes how, when, and where 
to apply the first kind of knowledge. These kinds of knowledge must be known 
to the system whether the knowledge is procedurally encoded to be executed or 
declaratively encoded to be examined and manipulated. The problem solving
knowledge and the domain knowledge must be stored in a knowledge base
accessible to the intelligent system. The knowledge base can take on the form
of procedures, production rules, semantic nets, procedural nets, or other 
representations. A particular representation may be more suited for some 
domains than others. Certain kinds of knowledge are more naturally expressed 
in one kind of representation than another. In the case of the SECURE system, 
since its task of aiding the flight crew is multi-faceted, a multi-leveled 
knowledge base is being developed to meet the task.
The knowledge base, though required, does not make an intelligent system 
by itself. The knowledge base is to be used by other programs. The
production rules are interpreted by the rule interpreter. The procedural net 
is adminstered by an executive. The semantic net is accessed by expert 
procedures. The knowledge base is an information source to be drawn upon by 
other program modules of the system.
The intelligent system is often a highly skilled expert designed to help 
people at some complex task. Communication between the program and people is 
necessary because the program receives instructions from people, the program 
issues results to people, or the program explains its actions to people. For 
the intelligent system to be of maximum utility the interface between people
3 AIRCRAFT MODELING
13
Part of our project has been the investigation of various kinds of 
aircraft models. Two aspects of this modeling work will be discussed here. 
First, an overview of the mock aircraft model we have developed for testing 
our monitoring strategies will be given. Second, considerations for 
constructing an aircraft model as part of a knowledge base as well as an 
example of what form this type of model might take will be discussed.
3.1 The Mock Aircraft Model
As stated previously, the purpose of the mock aircraft model is to 
provide a dynamic environment for testing the monitoring strategies we are 
developing. The model is used to provide the input to and to drive the rest 
of the monitoring system. The outputs of the model are the values of a subset 
of the sensors which are provided in a modern jet aircraft. Thus the mock 
aircraft model provides quantitative information and may be viewed as a rough 
simulation of certain features of an airplane which are relevent to out work.
The mock aircraft model roughly resembles a three engine commercial jet 
although some redundancy has been eliminated from some of the systems. The 
activities of the model fall into two major areas: maintaining the airplane's
position, speed and heading via a simple aerodynamic and navigation model and 
modeling the actions of the major subsystems of the aircraft. Figure 3-1 
shows the layout of the major subsystems of the mock airplane. The systems 
currently included in the model and the variables which are simulated are
summarized below.
Figure
151. Flight
elevator, ailerons, rudder, throttles, flaps, slats, speed 
brake, landing gear, TAS, IAS, rate of climb, pitch, bank
2. Navigation
DME, VOR, ADF, inertial navigation, magnetic compass, barometric 
altimiter, radio altimeter
3. Engines
throttles, starters, EPR, EGT, N1, N2, fuel flow, bleed valve
4. Hydraulic
flaps, slats, landing gear, hydraulic pressure, hydraulic fluid 
quantity
5. Electrical
generator bus ties, avionics breaker, lights breaker, galley 
breaker, generator voltage, generator frequency, generator load, 
bus voltage
6. Fuel
throttles, boost bump, x-feed valves, fuel valves, fuel 
quantity, fuel flow, fuel pressure, fuel filter pressure
One of the interests of our project is dealing with aircraft which are 
malfunctioning. To this end, the mock aircraft model allows faults to be 
introduced into the aircraft. These faults are of two types. Simple faults 
usually involve breaking a sensor in the aircraft so that the flight crew 
receives erroneous information. A complex fault generally involves the 
failure of some component of the aircraft. This failure then propagates to 
other parts of the aircraft. For example, consider the failure of the boost 
pump on engine #1. This leads to loss of fuel to engine #1, loss of engine 
#1, loss of generator #1, loss of hydraulic system #1 (and possibly loss of 
some controls), and increased load on generators #2 and #3. The faults which 
may be introduced into the mock aircraft model are summarized below.
1. Flight
controls, sensors, engines
2. Navigation
controls, sensors, INS, DME, VOR, ADF
3.
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Engines
controls, sensors, flameout, bleed valve stuck, fuel starvation
4. Hydraulic
controls, sensors, engine drive, hydraulic pump, hydraulic line, 
hydraulic resevoir, hydraulic cylinders
5. Electrical
controls, sensors, engine drive, generator, avionics, lights, 
galley
6. Fuel
controls, sensors, engine drive, electrical power, boost pump, 
fuel line, fuel filter, mechanical pump
3.2 Modeling as Part of the Knowledge Base
Another aspect of modeling we are working on is the developement of an 
aircraft model which will be part of the computer’s knowledge base. This type 
of model differs from the mock aircraft model in that it is designed to allow 
the computer to reason and draw logical conclusions about the operation of the 
airplane. As such, this type of model emphasizes the qualitative 
relationships inherent in the aircraft. The model provides knowledge of the 
underlying reasons why the various systems of the aircraft act and interact 
the way they do rather than providing the results of a numerical simulation of 
these systems. The knowledge base model abstracts a functional description of 
the aircraft rather than a physical description.
It is Important to keep several ideas in mind when constructing an 
aircraft model. The point of view taken when designing the model is 
important. Because we are working in the flight domain, two points of view 
are apparent i.e. the pilot and the flight engineer. The pilot is concerned 
with the general behavior of the aircraft and how the flight controls affect 
this behavior. The flight engineer on the other hand is more concerned with
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the proper functioning and trouble shooting of the various systems of the 
airplane. These two points of view suggest modeling at different levels of 
detail and that a hierarchical approach is appropriate.
The different levels of modeling are characterized by the level of detail 
that they express and their breadth of applicability. The top level model 
which is suitable for expressing activities similar to that of the pilot has 
the advantage of ease of understanding but has difficulty in situations where 
the aircraft is malfunctioning. The more detailed level of model would allow 
for checking and trouble shooting the airplane but encompasses too much detail 
to be convenient for the top level reasoning processes.
A representation for the knowledge base aircraft model is a Common Sense 
Algorithm (CSA)1.5 A CSA is a sematic net which has been adapted for describing 
the cause and effect relationships inherent in physical mechanisms. The basic 
nodes in the net are actions applied to the mechanism and states exhibited by 
the mechanism. The two major link types are causality and enablement i.e. 
actions cause state changes and states enable actions. Figure 3-2 is a 
summary of the nodes and links which may be used to construct a CSA network. 
A model of a subsystem in the aircraft is constructed by determining the 
actions and states which characterize the system and then mapping this 
characterization onto a CSA network with the appropriate structure of links 
and nodes.
Figure 3-3 is a top level CSA description of an engine and fuel system. 
It shows that the engine may be started by the action of pushing restart 
provided the electrical bus is active. Once the engine is started, it will 
sustain itself provided there is fuel going into the engine. Figure 3-4 is an 
expansion of the state node S: FUEL INTO ENGINE of Figure 3-3. This CSA
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Action
Tendency
State
State Change
One shot causality 
Continuous causality 
One shot enablement 
Continuous enablement 
State couple 
State equivalence 
State antagonism 
State change threshold
Causality gating 
Figure 3-2
Figure 3 -3
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shows that in order to get fuel into the engine we must satisfy three 
conditions: fuel available in a tank, pump force and fuel valve open.
CSA’s have sereral properties which make then attractive for the 
knowledge base model. CSA’s are a very modular representation which makes it 
easy to construct and modify the knowledge base. The network structure of a 
CSA model makes the cause and effect relationships describing the aircraft 
more explicit than if they were embedded in numerical formulas. This 
structure facilitates the use of the model for reasoning in that the computer 
may more easily trace the explicit cause and effect links in order to answer 
questions about the aircraft. For example, suppose we ask why an engine isn’t 
running. Tracing the CSA links of Figure 3-3 we see that this could be caused 
by failure to start the engine or failure to deliver fuel to the engine. 
These causes can be further traced via Figures 3-3 and 3-4 to possible 
problems in the engine ignition or fuel systems. Also it may be possible to 
adapt CSA's to a hierarchical structure to allow reasoning at differert levels 
of detail.
There are several potential uses of the knowledge base model in our 
monitoring system. Consequence analysis would use the model to predict the 
consequences of state changes in the aircraft. Trouble shooting would use the 
model to determine possible causes for faults which may be discovered in the 
aircraft. A planner will need a model with which to reason while constructing 
a recovery plan to get around any difficulties caused by a fault. Once a plan 
is constructed, the model may be used to check for unwanted side effects. 
This approach has the advantage over more convetional ones using preprogrammed 
recovery procedures in that if the model is properly constructed, situations 
which the programmer had not anticipated may be handled. Other sections of
this report will elaborate on these uses of the aircraft model.
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4 FLIGHT MONITORING
The onboard monitor is a module of the intelligent onboard computer 
system. The intelligent onboard computer system provides high-level 
assistance to the flight crew in all phases of the flight, and the monitor 
aids the crew in the detection of errors and faults that may occur in flight. 
The monitor receives inputs from the aircraft instrument sensors and advises 
the crew of the problems perceived and recommends corrective procedures.
4.1 Motivation
The concept of an intelligent monitor is the result of a series of
2
interviews conducted with various flight personnel. When questioned as to how 
can an intelligent onboard computer system aid the flight crew, the 
interviewed flight crews invariably included monitoring as a desirable task 
for the computer. The flight crew devoted a significant portion of their time 
to monitoring the aircraft and the flight. The crew repeatedly scan the 
instruments to verify that the support subsystems are functioning correctly 
and that the aircraft trajectory is correct. Having the computer monitor 
share this task of providing continuous detection of errors and faults would 
aid the crew in staying ahead of the aircraft.
A high-level intelligent monitor aids the crew in several ways. First, 
the monitor eases the crew’s high workload. During takeoff and landing, the 
workload is especially high; many procedures must be executed on a tight 
schedule. The situation is aggravated further in the case of the degraded 
capability aircraft since operation procedure is changed due to the reduced 
aircraft capability. The monitor can share in the error detection task, thus
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enabling the crew to devote more time to manage other aspects of the flight. 
Second, the monitor is able to store large amount of data about the aircraft. 
Physical and functional information about the aircraft subsystems and 
components can be retrieved from the monitor’s knowledge base. When a fault 
is detected, from its knowledge of the aircraft subsystems, the monitor can 
provide corrective procedures for the crew to choose from. Third, the monitor 
provides early error detection. The computer operates at a higher speed than 
people, and its performance is not effected by the repetitive scanning of the 
instrument sensors, thus ensuring error detection at the earliest possible 
moment and giving the crew more time to correct the error.
4.2 The Monitoring Function
Error detection is the primary function of the monitor. Error detection 
requires knowing the correct state of the aircraft. When the correct state of 
the aircraft is known, a comparison to the actual state of the aircraft would 
reveal the errors and faults that would require further attention. The 
difficulty of error detection lies in obtaining the correct state of the 
aircraft. The sophistication of monitoring is directly related to the degree 
of difficulty in obtaining the correct state of the aircraft, or the correct 
references, used in the comparison.
4.2.1 Static Constraint Monitoring
Simple monitoring involves static constraint where the constraint or 
reference remains fixed for long period of time and large number of 
situations. For example, to prevent engine overheating, the engine
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temperature should be below 800 degrees centigrade. To ensure proper engine 
lubrication, the oil pressure should be normal. These constraints are static 
in nature; they hold true except in unusual circumstances. The present 
warning systems aboard commercial aircraft today primarily utilize static 
constraints. Engine fire detection uses static engine temperature reference. 
Stall warning measures the angle of attack against the stall angle. At a 
higher level, the ground proximity warning system uses a combination of static 
constraints. The present static constraint monitoring systems have proved to 
be very useful, however the static constraint technique can not be applied to 
the more dynamic and fluid contexts as shown by the relatively frequent false 
alarms of the ground proximity system.
4.2.2 Dynamic Constraint Monitoring
More sophisticated monitoring involves quantities where the references 
are more difficult to obtain. The correct reference for quantities such as 
velocity, climb rate, altitude, throttle setting, flap setting is difficult to 
obtain because the correct value is a function of the phase of the flight, the 
equipment malfunctions, the control settings, and the environmental factors. 
The difficulty is due to the complex and dynamic nature of the flight domain.
Consider the normal takeoff profile of a three engined commercial jet 
aircraft as illustrated by figure 4-1. At the beginning of the takeoff roll, 
the flap and the slat are set at 50 percent extension, and the throttles are 
set at takeoff power. The aircraft rotates at velocity VR and climbs at ten 
knots over V2, the climb velocity. The gears are raised on positive rate of 
climb. At 1,000 ft, the climb rate is reduced to roughly 1,500 ft/min by 
lowering the pitch, and the flap and the slat are retracted at their
Normal Hlight Profile
Climb Rale—1 0 0 0 11/min.
F igure 4-1
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retraction speed. At 1,500 ft, the throttles are reduced to climb power and 
the aircraft climbs at roughly 1,000 ft/min. Now consider the single engine 
failure takeoff profile shown in figure 4-2. Engine 1 failed immediately 
after the aircraft is airborn. Now the aircraft climbs at velocity V2 instead 
of V2+10 knots. Throttle 1 is pulled back to idle, and at 1,000 ft the 
aircraft is leveled to gain velocity and to retract the flap and the slat. 
When the flap and slat are retracted, the other two throttles are pulled back 
to climb power, and the aircraft climbs at 210 knots. As shown by the above 
examples, the correct throttle, flap, and slat setting varies depending on the 
flight phase and the aircraft integrity. The flight profile for a short
duration of the flight, the takeoff phase, varies drastically depending on the 
aircraft capability.
A flight is a sequence of contexts, and what is correct for one context 
of the flight is not necessarily correct for another context. Thus to perform 
monitoring in a dynamic environment, the monitor must obtain the correct 
references dynamically from its awareness of the current environment and its 
knowledge base.
One scheme of dynamically obtaining the monitoring references takes
4
advantage of the sequential nature of a flight. A flight can be divided into 
the takeoff phase, the cruise phase, and the landing phase. These three
phases can be divided into finer sub-phases. For example, the takeoff phase 
can be subdivided into the start engine, the taxiing, the takeoff roll, the 
initial climb, and the second stage climb sub-phases. This heirarchical 
description of the flight is shown in figure 4-3. Each of the sub-phases 
specifies a context, and the correct references for the context can be 
determined and stored in the monitor’s knowledge structure.

Takeoff Cruise >- Landing
FP-6073
Figure i\-3
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A data structure that contains the correct references for the takeoff 
roll phase appears in figure 4-4. The data structure contains a header 
section that specifies the entry conditions or the characteristic features of 
the context. The header section is used to determine the applicability of the 
data structure. The rest of the data structure specifies the variables of 
concern and their references. When the monitor determines that the conditions 
specified in the header section are satisfied, it uses the references in that 
data structure to perform monitoring. A library of such data structures can 
cover the entire flight, thus providing the monitor with the necessary 
references.
Such a scheme of obtaining the monitoring references suffers from several 
drawbacks. The first problem is that the library can not cover all the 
situations that may arise during a flight. Even though the library can cover 
the regular phases of the flight and the more common failures such as the loss 
of an engine, it is not possible to anticipate all the fault and combinations 
of faults that can occur. The second problem is that it is possible for the 
monitor to apply the wrong set of references to a given situation. The header 
section that specifies the characteristic features of a context is limited in 
discrimination precision for otherwise the size of the library would be 
enormous. As a result of the limited discrimination precision of a context, 
it is possible for the monitor to apply an inappropriate set of references to 
certain unusual circumstances.
A flight monitor using the stored references technique has been 
implemented. It is used to verify our ideas about the sequence of contexts in 
flight and to provide the monitor module for the other modules in the 
intelligent onboard computer system to interact with. Due to the drawbacks
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TAKEOFF-ROLL-S
ENTRY CONDITIONS:
ALTITUDE: ZERO
ENGINE THRUST: CRUISE TAKEOFF 
FUEL: MAX
AIRSPEED: ZERO -» ONE HUNDRED 
POSITION: TO RUNWAY
NORMAL STATE:
GEAR: DOWN 
BRAKE: ZERO 
AIRSPEED:— ' ONE HUNDRED 
FUEL: MAX
THRUST: CRUISE -* TAKEOFF 
EGT: NORMAL 
RPM: NORMAL 
ALTITUDE: ZERO 
FLAP: EXTENDED 
SLAT: EXTENDED 
SPEEDBRAKE: RETRACTED 
CLIMB RATE: ZERO -* UP-2 
OTHERS: DON'T CARE
Figure 4-4
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cited above, a more sophisticated monitor that performs correctly in a wider 
variety of situations is desired.
4.3 Multi-Level Knowledge Base
Since it is not feasible to anticipate all the faults that may occur 
during flight, the monitor must have the knowledge to handle unexpected 
situations as they occur. The knowledge required span all levels of flying 
including knowledge of the general goals of a phase of flight, the aircraft 
aerodynamic performance capability, the flight maneuver techniques, and the 
aircraft subsystems. The knowledge required are organized into a structure 
called partitioned abstraction levels. A level is an abstraction of the 
knowledge of aircraft in flight because it contains only certain relevant 
portion of the total flight domain knowledge, and it is separated from other 
levels so that the relationship between the different levels or the 
relationship between knowledges of the different aspects of flight can be made 
explicit.
The knowledge base is divided into four levels. Level one specifies the 
flight phase goals, level two contains aerodynamic knowledge, level three 
consists of the aircraft maneuver knowledge, and level four holds the aircraft 
subsystem knowledge. The levels are also related heirarchically as shown in 
figure 4-5 and are ranked by their distance from the overall goals of a flight 
phase.
Level one knowledge base describes the overall characteristics of a 
flight. A flight can be described by a sequence of flight phases or contexts 
as shown in fugure 4-3. The expected behavior of the aircraft in a given
LEVEL 1 - DESIRED TRAJECTORY, 
CONTEXT GOALS
J
LEVEL 2 - AERODYNAMIC KNOWLEDGE
J >
Le v e l  3 - f l i g h t  m a n e u v e r KNOWLEDGE
J 1
LEVEL 4 - AIRCRAFT SUBSYSTEM KNOWLEDGE
F i g u r e  4-5
/
34
context is stored in a data structure associated with that context. 
Figure 4-6 shows such a data structure that is associated with the climb phase 
of a typical flight. The aerodynamic goals of the aircraft in the climb phase 
is to accelerate to a velocity of 340 kt. and to climb to an altitude of 
31,000 ft. In addition to the aerodynamic goals, the data structure also
contains the prioritized constraints for a context. The prioritized
constraints are the ranked constraints on the aerodynamic quantities used to 
describe the desired behavior of the aircraft when it is in degraded
operation. For example, in the climb phase, the prioritized constraints 
specifies that is most important to protect the engine thrust, then maintain 
altitude, then keep the aircraft velocity greater than two hundred knots, then 
minimize the gear, flap, and slat extensions, etc. The aerodynamic goals and 
the prioritized constraints of level one are given in aerodynamic quantities 
since they will be passed to the aerodynamic experts of level two to be 
achieved.
Level two deals with the aircraft trajectory and the forces that 
influence it. The aircraft moving through air is viewed as a point mass 
pushed by forces such as lift, thrust, weight, and drag. Figure 4-7 
illustrates the force vectors that affect the aircraft in flight. The level 
two knowledge base consists of the force vector model of the aircraft and 
methods of obtaining quantities such as velocity and climb rate by 
manipulating the model. The model consists of force equations as shown by 
examples in figure 4-8. The equations are stored instead of hard coded, thus 
can be retrieved, examined, and manipulated. It can be seen in figure 4-8 
that the lift is a function of the aircraft body lift coefficient, the angle 
of attack(alpha), and the velocity. It can be determined that the velocity 
has the greatest effect on lift, but to maintain lift at low velocity, the
CLIMB PHASE
Level 1. Goals 
(accelerate-to velocity 3A0 kt) and 
(climb-to ALTITUDE 31,000 ft)
Level 1. Prioritized constraints
1. (protect engine-thrust)
2. (climb-rate ^  0)
7 J . (velocity ^  200 kt)
A, (minimize airframe-drag)
5, (climb-rate low)
6. (velocity ^  250 kt)
7, (climb-rate ^  500 ft/min)
Figure A-6
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Figure 4-7
Level 2. Force Vector Model
Described By Equations
Thrust = Engine-Thrust + Gravity-Component 
- Reverse-Thrust
Drag = Fluid-Drag + Induced-Drag + Brake-Drag 
Lift = Lift-Coefficient * Alpha * (velocity)^  
Fluid-Drag = Drag-Coefficient * Alpha * (velocity)
Figure i|-8
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angle of attack and the lift coefficient should be increased, thus translating 
to elevator movement and flap and slat extensions. In addition to providing 
qualitative knowledge about aircraft aerodynamics, the equations can also be 
executed in a quantitative fashion thus providing a simulator for the 
aircraft. The quantitative model can be used to estimate the effect of an 
aircraft configuration.
Level three holds the knowledge about the flight controls used to 
directly affect the aircraft trajectory. Level three contains the
relationships between the aerodynamic quantities of level two and the physical 
aircraft control settings. Figure 4-9 illustrates such relationships. The 
intangible quantities of engine thrust is associated with the throttle 
setting, and the abstract lift coefficient is translated into flap setting. 
Level three relates the flight techniques available to the crew to the 
aerodynamic quantities of level two. The abstract goals and variables of 
level one and level two are now translated to the physical aircraft 
configuration. However, the controls specified by level three are those 
directly affecting the aircraft trajectory such as flap, slat, elevator, 
spoiler, landing gear, and the throttle setting.
The aircraft controls that do not directly affect the aircraft trajectory 
belong to level four. Level four contains knowledge about the aircraft 
subsystems that enable the aircraft to fly. As shown in figure 4-10, examples 
of level four knowledge are that engine integrity and the proper fuel flow are 
necessary to support engine thrust and that hydraulic pressure is necessary to 
enable flap movement. The aircraft subsystems dealt with in level four are 
the engine system, the fuel system, the electrical system, and the hydraulic 
system. The aircraft controls known in level four include electrical breaker,
Le v e l  3 F l i g h t  T e c h n i q u e s
To OBTAIN ENGINE THRUST OF 40 KLB
SET THROTTLE AT T, 0. POWER.
To OBTAIN HIGHER LIFT COEFFICIENT 
SET FLAPS AT 22°,
To OBTAIN MORE BRAKING FORCE 
DECREASE LIFT AND 
APPLY BRAKE PRESSURE,
F i g u r e  4-9
Le v e l  4 Su p p o r t  S u b s y s t e m s
To SUPPORT ENGINE THRUST
MAINTAIN FUEL FLOW AND PROTECT 
AGAINST ENGINE OVERLOAD.
To SUPPORT FLAP MOVEMENT ^
MAINTAIN HYDRAULIC PRESSURE.
F i g u r e  ¿¡-1q
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bus-tie relay, hydraulic pump, fuel pump, cross-feed valve, etc.
Level four contains both physical and functional knowledge about the 
subsystems. Physical knowledge specify the location of the components and the 
connection between the components. Functional knowledge specify the causal 
relationship between the states of components. For example, fuel will flow 
into the engine only if there is fuel in the tank, if the boost pump is 
pumping, if the fuel valve is open, if there is no obstruction in the fuel 
line, and if the fuel pump is pumping also. Functional relationships can be 
represented by cause-effect graph structures such as shown in figure 4-11. 
The cause-effect graph structure can also be organized in a heirarchical 
fashion.
The abstraction levels are heirarchically organized by its distance to 
the high-level definition of the flight and by the direct dependence 
relationship between levels. For example, the velocity goal of level one is 
achieved by the proper relationship between the thrust, lift, drag, and weight 
force vectors and the angle of attack of level two. The desired thrust and 
angle of attack are passed to level three and translated to the correct 
throttle setting and elevator setting. The level four experts then make sure 
the proper fuel flow is delivered to the engine and the hydraulic system 
functions correctly to enable elevator movement.
The heirarchical levels facilitate two types of monitoring: top-down and
bottom-up. Top-down monitoring is the mapping from level one goals to the 
level four physical system states, and it can detect errors through indirect 
evidence and generate corrective procedure recommendations. Bottom-up 
monitoring is the mapping from the level four physical states to the level one 
goals. The bottom-up mapping is also called consequence interpretation. The
F i g u r e  4-11
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significance of an event in a level is interpreted at the next higher level. 
For example, the significance of an overheating engine is interpreted at level 
three to be the shutting down of the engine. Level two experts interpret the 
shutting down of the engine as a reduction of velocity and climb rate. Level 
one experts note the expected reduction of velocity and climb rate due to the 
drgradation of the engine system and refer to the prioritized constraints to 
determine the desired velocity and climb rate schedule. Then planning can 
proceed from level one to level four, and when the planning is done, the 
monitor can issue the recommendations to the crew.
The partitioned abstraction level is an architecture for a 
knowledge-based monitor. The levels are organized for conceptual clarity in 
the division of the knowledge about the aircraft and flying. The levels also 
allow the specification of the relationships between levels. The 
implementation of the architecture is underway, however it is not yet 
completed. Most of the effort spent thus far is concentrated on level one and 
level two. In order to test the architecture and to demonstrate the system, 
portions of level three and level four have also been implemented. Due to the 
time and manpower limitations, only a limited number of scenarios can be 
demonstrated, however, the completed scenarios happily confirm our confidence 
in the architecture.
The monitor is a part of the intelligent onboard computer system and 
interacts with the other modules of the system. In particular, it calls on 
the diagnosis system for help when necessary. The diagnosis system localizes 
faults in the sybsystem using diagnostic and subsystem knowledge and is 
discussed in more detail in section five. The monitor and the diagnostic 
system can call on each other and pass relevant information to each other as
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shown in figure 4-12. The monitor calls on the diagnosis system 'when it 
detects indirect evidences indicating that there may be a fault in the system.
The following is a walkthrough scenario that illustrates top-down 
monitoring, or monitoring through indirect evidence. The scenario can also be 
demonstrated on the computer. The environment for the scenario is provided by 
the aircraft simulator. The aircraft simulator provides aerodynamic and 
internal subsystem simulation of the aircraft. The aircraft is modeled after 
the popular present day three engined commercial jet aircrafts. The relevant 
internal subsystems are shown in figure 4-13. The monitor, the diagnosis 
program, and the aircraft simulator runs simultaneously on the computer under 
time-sharing. The simulator passes the state of the aircraft to the monitor 
and the diagnosis program upon request, and this is shown is figure 4-12. As 
discussed in section three, the experimenter can alter the aircraft control 
settings via a terminal keyboard thus playing the role of the flight crew. 
The experimenter can also set faults in the simulated aircraft, providing a 
realistic environment for the monitor and the diagnosis program.
The scenario is set in the climb phase of the flight. Refer to 
figure 4-14 for the outline of the scenario. The aircraft has just taken off 
the ground. The landing gear is raised and the throttles are pulled back to 
climb power. The pitch is lowered and the velocity increases. When the flap 
and slat retraction speed approach, the flap and slat are retracted. At this 
point the monitor notices that the aircraft velocity and climb rate are lower 
than expected given its aerodynamic knowledge of the aircraft and the present 
aircraft configuration. From its awareness of the forces acting on the 
aircraft, the monitor concludes that the possible causes are either low thrust 
or high drag. The monitor then calls the diagnosis system asking it to check
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Figure 4-12
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F i g u r e  4-13
INITIAL STATE:
CLIMB PHASE 
CLIMB POWER 
CLEAN AIRFRAME
SYMPTOMS:
LOW VELOCITY 
LOW CLIMB RATE
DIAGNOSIS:
ENGINE 1 BLEED VALVE FAILED 
FLAP STUCK IN OPEN POSITION 
FLAP SENSOR FAILED
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
THROTTLE DOWN ENGINE 1
LIMIT VELOCITY
CLIMB AT LOWER CLIMB RATE
F i g u r e  4-14
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out the engines, the flap, the slat, and the landing gear. The diagnosis 
system returns with the messge that the engine one bleed valve has failed and 
the flap is stuck in the open position. Once given the failures, the monitor 
recommends shutting down engine one since the bleed valve failure increases 
fuel consumption for the thrust produced and there are still two good engines 
left. The monitor is also aware of the velocity limitation on the aircraft 
when the flap is extended to avoid flap damage. The monitor then reminds the 
crew of the speed limitation and adjusts the climb rate goal to a lower more 
appropriate value. Using its aerodynamic knowledge, the monitor arrives at 
the thrust and angle of attack values that satisfy the velocity, climb rate, 
and the reduced thrust capacity constraints. The disired thrust and angle of 
attack values are then translated into throttle and elevator settings and 
communicated to the crew.
This scenario illustrates monitoring using indirect evidence. High level 
knowledge is used to detect the possiblity of system fault and to point the 
diagnosis system in the right direction. When the diagnosis system has 
located the faults, the constraints imposed by the faults on the flight are 
communicated to the crew. Planning then proceeds from the abstract to the 
concrete, incorporating the new constrants, and the recommended control 
settings are finally communicated to the crew.
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5 SUBSYSTEM DIAGNOSIS AND INSTRUMENT VERIFICATION
The Diagnosis and Verification system is to have the computer monitoring 
aircraft from the Flight Engineer’s point of view. It provides two essential 
functions: (1 ) verifying instrument readings to avoid ’’false alarm”, and (2 )
locating the source of subsystem failure. With the diagnosis report, the 
Monitor can properly follow up the abnormal situation if failure ever occurred 
in the subsystem.
5.1 Review of Fault Detecting Techniques
Subsystem failures can be detected through the following ways:
1. Verification of Redundant Information:
Airplanes are usually equipped with redundant instruments. 
Disagreement among the related instruments provides primary 
indication for a certain category of failure. For example, the 
engine Fuel Flow reading is supposed to be matched with the 
dropping rate of the tank Fuel Quantity reading. If the 
dropping rate is abnormally higher than the Fuel Flow, it may be 
because of either a gauge failure or a leaking fuel system.
4
The Instrument Verification System, developed earlier for 
this project, was implemented as part of the Monitor to detect 
instrument failures based on the verification of the redundant 
sensor information.
2. Comparison with the Subsystem Performance Model:
It is the flight engineer’s duty to be familiar with the 
normal performance of each aircraft subsystem in response to the 
control parameters. In the flight manual, the engine 
performance chart gives the quantitative relationship among 
various jet engine parameters (N1, N2, EGT, EPR, FF) in response 
to the throttle setting at a particular environment (airspeed, 
air density). Normal range of the hydraulic pressure, oil 
pressure, fuel temperature and other subsystem parameters are 
also specified. Based on these same information, the Monitor 
can detect deviations.
3. Indirect Fault Detection through Secondary Effect:
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A subsystem failure, if not caught directly by some proper 
sensor, can be indirectly detected by its secondary effect on 
other subsystems or the aerodynamic performance of the airplane. 
An electrical power failure in the Galley bus can be traced back 
to the faulty circuit breaker. A lack of climbing speed can be 
traced back to a faulty bleed-valve which causes engine 
malfunctioning.
5.2 About Subsystem Diagnosis
When fault occurs in certain subsystem, the effect usually propagates to 
other subsystems whose operations are depending on the output of this faulty 
subsystem. As a result, instead of having a dedicated indication on the exact 
cause(s) of failure, the pilot can be expected to look at an instrument panel 
with abnormal instrument indications and flashing warning lights all over. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the instruments/sensors 
themselves may be faulty. Facing such situation, it will be relying on the 
pilot’s knowledge about the subsystems to properly interpret the abnormality.
What can the Computer Diagnosis system do is to provide a comprehensive 
report about the abnormal situation. Relying on the knowledge about the 
failure symptoms of each subsystem as well as the relationship among subsystem 
functions, the computer diagnosis system traces back the function-dependency 
chain from the detected secondary fault indication to pinpoint the original 
source of failure. Based on the same knowledge, the diagnosis system is able 
to verify a suspicious failure situation with its effects on other dependent 
subsystems and to distinguish between an instrument failure and a true 
subsystem failure. For example, if some of the engine parameters are reading 
low - an indication of a possible engine flame-out - while the related 
generator, hydraulic, oil systems are running normally, the diagnosis system
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will conclude that it is more likely an instrument failure rather than an 
engine failure.
5.3 Diagnosis Knowledge Base
There are two types of knowledge contained in the computer knowledge base 
to support the Diagnosis system. One type of knowledge describes the 
functional behavior of each component under abnormal situation. The other 
type lays out the functional relationship among various components. The 
representational structure of these knowledge within the computer is described 
below:
1. FAILURE MODES for each subsystem:
For each of the failure situation about a particular 
subsystem, its associative local symptoms are stored in the 
knowledge base. For example [see Fig. 5-1], the symptoms 
associated with the "bleed-valve failure" of the engine
subsystem are N1:low, N2:low, EGT:high, EPR:low, ...
The abnormal symptoms may be caused by a local fault, or it 
may be inherited from other functionally related subsystems. As 
an example, the local failures associated with the Engine
subsystem are FLAME-OUT, BLEED-VALVE FAILURE, FUEL-CONTROL 
FAILURE. Each is characterized by an unique set of abnormal
engine parameters. Nevertheless, not all of the engine
malfunctions result from the engine local problems.
Fuel-starvation, which also causes engine flame out, is 
inherited from the Fuel subsystem problem which may in term be 
the consequence of a faulty Electrical subsystem.
2. FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP among Dependent Subsystems:
When a particular failure is inherited from other dependent 
subsystem, such "dependency" is explicitly specified in the 
knowledge base. For example [see Fig. 5-2], a low BOOST-PUMP 
output may be resorted to a "low fuel-supply" from FUEL TANK or 
a "electrical-power off" from the COMMON BUS.
ENGINE
LOCAL FAILURES
FLAME-OUT
BLEED-VALVE FAILURE
EXTERNAL FAILURE
----- -FUEL STARVATION
FUEL-FILTER
LOCAL FAILURE
FILTER CLOGGED
EXTERNAL FAILURE
- - - - - *• LOW FUEL SUPPLY
ENGINE-FUEL-PUMP
Fig, 5-1, Example of Knowledge Base.
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BOOST-PUMP
LOCAL FAILURE
PUMP FAILURE
EXTERNAL FAILURES
----- * “  ELECTRICAL -  POWER OFF
----- -  LOW FUEL SUPPLY
■ FUEL-TANK
LOCAL FAILURES
TANK EMPTY 
TANK LINE CLOGGED
EXTERNAL FAILURE
___________ (n o n f )______________
J BOOST-PUMP-SWITCH
LOCAL FAILURES
SWITCH OFF 
CKT FAILURE
EXTERNAL FAILURE
.. .ELECTRICAL-BUS OFF
■ELECTRICAL-BUS
Fig, 5-2. Example of Knowledge Base.
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5.4 Diagnostic Inference Program
With the necessary diagnostic knowledge stored in the knowledge base, the 
Diagnostic Inference program is designed to make use of such knowledge to 
answer the question raised by the Monitor (or other potential users) about the 
suspicious system parameters. The diagnostic process can be described in four 
phases: FAULT HYPOTHESIZATION, CONSEQUENCE VERIFICATION, DEPENDENCY-DIRECTED 
BACKTRACKING and FAULT IDENTIFICATION [see Fig. 5-3].
1. Fault Hypothesization
When a system parameter is questioned about its status (for 
example, Is the THRUST on ENGINE- 1 LOW?), the Diagnosis system 
looks into the knowledge base for the subsystem that is directly 
responsible for that parameter (in this example, the ENGINE 
subsystem). THis thus opens a diagnostic "window” on a
particular portion of the knowledge base so that the diagnostic 
process can be focussed on. The description within the window 
lists all the possible syndromes related to the focussed
subsystem. The list of syndromes (namely, FLAME-OUT,
BLEED-VALVE FAILURE, FUEL-CONTROL FAILURE, FUEL-STARVATION) are 
the initial fault hypotheses for the diagnostic process.
2 . Consequence Verification
As a failure situation is questioned on a particular
subsystem, the Diagnosis system firstly looks for possible
instrument fault. Based on its knowledge about the subsystems 
modeled in the Diagnosis knowledge base, it verifies the
corresponding symptoms of every hypothesis with its 
consequences. Thus, a suspicious engine flame-out will be 
verified with its related oil-pressure reading, hydraulic 
indications, and generator output parameters. An instrument 
failure can then be logically determined, and thus avoid issuing 
a "false alarm".
3. Dependency-Directed Backtracking
On the other hand, if the failure situation is confirmed 
with its consequence, the Diagnosis system will proceed to 
locate the faulty system(s) that causes the abnormal situation. 
Based on the knowledge about the function-dependency among the 
subsystems, it traces back to all the dependent subsystems whose 
failures may potentially cause current abnormal situation. For 
example, if the Engine subsystem is questioned for lack of 
thrust, the Diagnosis system will initiate the Consequence 
Verification phase by looking into the knowledge base for those 
subsystems that are affected by the functions of the Engine
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Fig, 5-3, Fault Diagnosis Process
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subsystem. As a result, the corresponding Oil system, Hydraulic 
system and Generator system are the targets to be used for the 
verification of the Engine system. If the abnormal engine 
performance is confirmed, then the Dependency-directed 
Troubleshooting phase begins. By refering to the "functional 
dependency" description in the knowledge base, the Diagnosis 
system finds those subsystems whose failures may cause current 
abnormal performance in the Engine subsystem. In this example, 
the Fuel subsystem is the only candidate. Now a question is to 
be raised on the Fuel subsystem. The process of 
HYPOTHESIZATION-VERIFICATION-BACKTRACKING is again repeated on 
the Fuel subsystem (which may finally trace back to a faulty 
Electrical subsystem).
4. Fault Identification
If the results from all of the dependency-directed 
backtracks are negative, then an inherited failure is not likely 
and the Diagnosis system concludes that it is a failure local to 
the current subsystem. It then matches the given abnormal 
situation with each of the local failure pattern to pinpoint the 
cause of failure.
5.5 Conclusion and Perspective
The capability of a computer Diagnosis system is determined by the 
following factors:
1. The accuracy of the subsystem model, especially its resolution 
power when multiple failures have occurred.
Based on regular engine parameters (N1, N2, EGT, EPR, FF), 
it is difficult to recognize a mixed failure situation caused by 
both malfunctioning engine fuel-control and faulty bleed-valve. 
A solution is to add more sensors to the engine subsystem to 
provide detailed information within the engine.
2. The amount of sensor information available -
The computer-based system suffers from a physical 
disadvantage - it does not have the visual and other 
sophisticated human sensory input to get the "feeling" about the 
flight. However, one important reason why more sensors are not 
added to current airplane is that excessive instruments tends to 
distract the pilot more than to help. The computer, with its 
tremendous data processing capability, can make better use of 
the large amount of sensory information.
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3. The ability to suggest Diagnostic Experiment -
For any practical purpose, the Diagnosis system will work 
on a domain with only limited sensors. Thus in many cases, it 
is not possible to expect the Diagnosis system to come with one 
exact answer. Based on the information presented at the time, 
the Diagnosis system can pin down the possible causes of failure 
to a relatively smaller set. In order to determine what
alternatives the pilot might have under such circumstances, a 
purposeful experiment can be suggested to the pilot to perform 
on the aircraft, and then can be properly followed up from 
observing the response [see Fig. 5-4]. For example, if one of 
the engine parameters indicates a possible flame-out while other 
engine indications are normal, a diagnostic experiment to reduce 
engine throttle setting by 50% will give a clear picture about 
the ambiguous situation.
FP-6522
Fig, 5-4, A More Elaborate Fault 
Diagnosis Scheme,
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this report we outlined several concrete examples of how one could 
program a computer to exhibit abilities of intelligent monitoring in the 
cockpit environment and to automatically diagnose faulty subsystems. Such a 
system could be of great value in increasing the safety of a flight, as well 
as in lowering the workload during such busy times as landing and take-off, 
thus allowing the crew to focus their attention on more important tasks at 
hand.
For any given context or state of the aircraft, monitoring can be 
achieved by comparing values of variables to what they are supposed to be. 
The difficulty is due to the dynamic nature of the flight where references are 
indeed moving targets which cannot be totally put into the form of tables for 
static comparison.
To solve the problem in its full dynamic context we propose the approach 
of an intelligent system based on an internally stored knowledge base. With 
the help of the knowledge base the system is capable of keeping up with 
changing contexts and fluctuations in variables, and thereby is able to derive 
a set of dynamic references for verification and checking. If deviations are 
detected, a warning is issued to the diagnosis system which will then 
determine the probable cause or the faulty components, so that an alternative 
course of actions can be planned.
The system is intelligent because it is:
1 . capable of monitoring the operation of the aircraft through 
indirect means and the use of dynamic references,
2 . capable of making automatic diagnoses of subsystems containing 
single and multiple faults of components or subsystems, and
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3. capable of planning, problem-solving and generating alternative 
plans based on the knowledge of aircraft system models.
We believe that the present system is an impressive demonstration of the 
potential of our approach, and this progress leads to a number of promising 
avenues for further investigation.
1 ) The multi-level structure proposed lends itself to the study of 
problem-solving activities that are not possible otherwise. A constant 
look-ahead is possible by contemplations that become necessary because of a 
potential problem. With the slightest sign of a possible malfunction, one 
could begin to anticipate a potential emergency and prepare to act in time.
2) It is also possible to consider the case of weather difficulties or 
any other causes that may make it necessary for the system to derive a new 
flight plan which optimizes in the multi-dimensional world of energy, time, 
facilities available, and passenger inconvenience.
3) A system can be developed to analyze the consequence of any potential 
action and to reason out what modifications are necessary.
4) The knowledge base can be extensively programmed to serve as an expert 
system onboard for the purposes of crew consultation. Automatic check-listing 
will then become a simple application of the broad range of possibilities of 
usage.
5) The modeling technique can be extended to include both qualitative and 
quantitative information so that predictions can be made quickly as well as 
logically.
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These are just some of the immediate possibilities for extending the work 
in useful directions. It is obvious that when such systems are available, 
experts in the aviation industry, in both the airline and the aircraft 
manufacturing sector, will find a number of uses for the basic system and will 
adapt it to many new applications.
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